International organizations regularly enjoy immunity from suit in employment-related cases. Instead of litigation before various national courts, staff members are supposed to bring their complaints before internal grievance mechanisms and ultimately before administrative tribunals set up by the organizations. The scope of jurisdiction of such administrative tribunals largely covers the kind of staff disputes insulated from national court scrutiny as a result of the immunity from legal process enjoyed by international organizations. Inspired by the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, in particular its 1999 Waite and Kennedy judgment according to which the jurisdictional immunity of international organizations may depend upon the availability of "reasonable alternative means" to protect effectively the rights of staff members, more and more national courts are equally looking at the availability and adequacy of alternative dispute settlement mechanisms. Some of them have even concluded that the non-availability of legal protection through an administrative tribunal or the inadequacy of the level of protection afforded by internal mechanisms justifies a withdrawal of immunity in order to avoid a denial of justice contrary to human rights demands.
I. Introduction 1. Questions concerning the immunity of international organizations, in particular in the context of employment disputes, are of utmost importance to administrative tribunals, which have been established precisely for the purpose of settling disputes between international organizations and their employees in a predictable and coherent way. Litigation of staff disputes before national courts, perhaps even courts in different States, is thought to put the uniform employment law at risk and may lead to a fragmented and differentiated level of protection. As a matter of substance and of procedure, different national courts may provide international organizations' staff members with different remedies, claims and types of compensation; they may demand different forms of evidence and offer different procedural rights. 1 The immunity of the employer international organization is intended to avoid these consequences. At the same time, the availability of an alternative employment dispute settlement mechanism in the form of administrative tribunals is intended to ensure the uniform interpretation and application of the internal employment law of international organizations. 2. Viewed from this policy perspective, there is an obvious correlation between the scope of jurisdiction of administrative tribunals, on the one hand, and the immunity afforded to international organizations in employment matters, on the other. This relationship will be scrutinized in the first part of this paper. Beyond policy arguments, it will also look at the legal framework of the jurisdictional immunity granted to international organizations and it will address the relevant practice of national courts and administrative tribunals. In addition, questions of immunity and jurisdiction may arise with regard to administrative tribunals themselves. Disappointed staff members who have unsuccessfully brought their complaints before administrative tribunals may attempt to challenge their decisions. Whether this is possible is itself a matter of jurisdiction, i.e. a question of whether an appeal or review mechanism has been provided for. At the same time, immunity issues are raised where litigants turn to national courts in order to challenge administrative tribunal decisions.
II. The immunity of international organizations and the availability of administrative tribunals
3. The jurisdiction of administrative tribunals is usually seen as complementary to the immunity enjoyed by the respondent international organization. Because an international organization enjoys immunity in disputes brought by private parties, including staff members, it has to provide an alternative judicial or quasi-judicial recourse to justice. Thus, it establishes administrative tribunals or submits to the jurisdiction of existing administrative tribunals. This correlation is usually regarded as the consequence of a policy goal of providing staff members with access to a legal remedy in order to pursue their employment-related rights. But it is increasingly also seen as a legal requirement stemming from treaty obligations incumbent upon international organizations, as well as a result of human rights obligations involving access to justice.
4. The policy consideration that an international organization, and in particular one such as the United Nations (UN), should make provision for the orderly, judicial or quasi-judicial settlement of staff disputes was already clearly expressed in the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Effect of Awards Case, 2 in which it upheld the legality of the creation of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal (UNAT 5. Clearly, the Court did not speak of a legal obligation incumbent upon the UN to set up an administrative tribunal. One should note, however, that this was not the question put before to the Court. Rather, the ICJ was asked to give an opinion on the issue of whether awards rendered by such a tribunal were binding. Whether the UN was empowered to set up the tribunal rendering such awards was an incidental question that it had to, and did, answer. It is remarkable, however, that in the above-quoted passage, the Court alluded to a human rights demand inherent in the UN Charter. It found that it would be "hardly consistent" with the goals of the UN and its Charter if this organization did not provide a legal remedy for staff disputes; obviously relying here on the underlying notion of a right of access to justice, as implicitly contained in the customary international law prohibition of a denial of justice 5 and in contemporary human rights 6. One may still view the ICJ's opinion as a mere expression of a "policy" mandate for "compensating" the immunity of the UN with an alternative remedy. There are, however, other-and, from a historical perspective, probably even more pertinent-considerations that may be regarded as "harder" obligations for international organizations to provide not only legal remedies but also access to justice for staff members and other private parties. These considerations have found legal expression in the various privileges and immunities instruments which contain an obligation to make available dispute settlement mechanisms to those who are deprived of access to national courts as a result of the international organization's immunity from suit. The prime example of such an obligation is found in the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, the so-called General Convention.
7 While granting wide jurisdictional immunity to the UN, 8 8 Art. II Section 2 of the General Convention, above n.7, provides: "The United Nations, its property and assets wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except insofar as in any particular case it has expressly waived its immunity. It is, however, understood that no waiver of immunity shall extend to any measure of execution."
9 Art. VIII Section 29(a) of the General Convention, above n.7. of both types of private persons, the outside contractor envisaged by the treaty provisions and the employee apparently not covered, is almost identical. In both cases, the "weak" individual is seeking access to justice in pursuing his or her claims against the "strong", immunityprotected international organization. Thus, it has been suggested that the dispute settlement obligations contained in the General and Special Convention and similar treaties might imply a duty of international organizations to establish administrative tribunals.
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8. Both the General Convention and the Special Convention are multilateral treaties concluded by the Member States of the UN and of the specialized agencies in question, and not by the organizations themselves. Thus, there is, strictly speaking, no direct treaty obligation on the organizations to carry out the duty to provide alternative dispute settlement mechanisms. However, it is obvious that the UN and other international organizations are the beneficiaries of the privileges and immunities contained in the General and the Special Convention and should thus also bear implicit duties. 13 In fact, the absence of a clear direct treaty obligation is rarely addressed. Instead, international courts and tribunals regularly acknowledge the connection between the immunity from national courts and the obligation of the UN to provide for alternative dispute settlement modes as expressed in the General Convention. 14 9. There are also other immunity provisions which stress the inter-relationship between immunity and the obligation to provide at least an alternative means of access to justice. This can be illustrated by reference to a number of provisions which aim at ensuring that immunity would not lead to a denial of justice. Typical examples of such an indirectly conditioned immunity are provisions which oblige an international organization to waive its immunity where such immunity "would impede the course of justice."
15 While the decision "to waive or not to waive" immunity remains that of the organization and is thus not reviewable by national courts, it is clear that this form of implicit limitation of the immunity of an international organization also reinforces the idea that potential claimants should at least have a right of access to some type of judicial or quasi-judicial dispute settlement. 
II.A. Access to justice for employees of international organizations as a human rights concern
10. The need to provide for dispute settlement in order to counterbalance the immunity of international organizations is not only a demand of fairness and justice. Over time, the idea that everyone (including staff members of international organizations) has a right of access to justice, in the form of a right to have access to a court or an equivalent mechanism of independent and impartial dispute settlement, has gained ground. Regional international organizations, such as the European Community (EC)/European Union (EU), have gradually acknowledged that they are neither above the law nor unbound by human rights obligations simply because their constituent treaties do not contain any such duties. Instead, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has developed a jurisprudence declaring human rights to be indirectly binding, because they form part of the general principles of law binding upon all subjects of international law. 16 From its inception in the late 1960s/early 1970s, this EC/EU fundamental rights case law clearly had the potential to produce a spillover effect towards other international organizations; and it has done so. While there is an enduring debate over whether the UN, and in particular the Security Council, is bound by general international law, and thus by the human rights obligations that form part of custom and/or general principles, 17 it has become an almost mainstream belief that international organizations are in general bound by international law.
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11. In fact, the concept that human rights are binding upon international organizations has been endorsed by many administrative tribunals in their jurisprudence. UNAT 14. Although the ECtHR did not elaborate on what the specific characteristics of such "reasonable alternative means" might be, and although it did not make the availability of an alternative forum a strict prerequisite for immunity but only regarded it a "material factor", 29 this "conditionality" for granting immunity to an international organization has fallen on fertile ground in the subsequent case law of various national courts in Europe. 15. The general principle of law that employees of international organizations should have access to a form of employment dispute settlement has also been recognized by administrative tribunals. The leading case is the ILOAT's judgment in Chadsey, wherein the tribunal relied upon "the principle that any employee is entitled in the event of a dispute with his employer to the safeguard of some appeals procedure." 31 In the later Rubio case, the ILOAT spoke more broadly of the principle "that an employee of an international organisation is entitled to the safeguard of an impartial ruling by an international tribunal on any dispute with the employer." 32 16. The UNAT expressly relied on the Chadsey holding in Teixera, in which the UN refused to agree to arbitrate a dispute that had arisen with a non-staff member for some three years. 33 Mindful of the UN's duty to provide for appropriate modes of dispute settlement contained in Article VIII Section 29 of the General Convention, the Tribunal awarded damages to the applicant for the delay. 17. In some cases, administrative tribunals have even interpreted the scope of their jurisdiction in a deliberately broad fashion in order to avoid a situation which would deprive claimants of their right of access to dispute settlement. As early as the Irani case in 1971, 34 the UNAT had extended its jurisdiction to a dispute involving a non-staff member. It noted that 38 The jurisdiction of this special panel was, however, very limited; it was basically restricted to scrutinizing the legality of a termination of employment. In Zafari, the applicant disputed that the end of his employment was to be qualified as an early voluntary retirement, whereas in Salaymeh, the applicant complained that the calculation of his contribution to UNRWA's pension fund was incorrect.
In both cases, UNAT thought that the Special Panel of Adjudicators would lack jurisdiction.
In the Tribunal's view, applicant Zafari was "thus deprived of any recourse against the decision of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA" and "has truly been denied justice. 43 Zafari v. UNRWA, above n.36, para X. In Salaymeh, the UN Administrative Tribunal relied on Zafari and held that "the Tribunal's competence is derived from the lack of any jurisdictional procedure laid down by the 19. The gradual consolidation of the idea that international organizations are under a human rights obligation to provide access to staff dispute settlement has also found expression in the opinion of some international organizations that the establishment of administrative tribunals was the fulfilment of an international legal obligation. For instance, when the World Bank Administrative Tribunal was set up in 1980, the official explanatory report referred to a principle accepted in many national legal systems and reaffirmed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which required that, wherever administrative power was exercised, a machinery should be available to accord a fair hearing and due process to an aggrieved party in cases of disputes. in respect of employment issues. 49 The US court, however, interpreted the provision to permit only suits in respect of external affairs of the Bank, thus holding the Bank immune from suits in employment disputes. According to the Mendaro court, the Bank's members only intended to waive the organization's immunity from suit with respect to its debtors, creditors, bondholders, and those other potential plaintiffs to whom the Bank would have subject itself to suit in order to achieve its chartered objectives. Since a waiver of immunity from employees' suits arising out of internal administrative grievances is not necessary for the Bank to perform its functions, this immunity is preserved by the members' failure expressly to waive it. 21. With regard to employment disputes, the D.C. Court of Appeals expressly held that the purpose of immunity from employee actions is rooted in the need to protect international organizations from unilateral control by a member nation over the activities of the international organization within its territory.
51
22. More recently, however, national courts have taken care in examining the "human rights impact" of their immunity decisions. This "judicial notice" may take different forms. Courts may find that there are alternative remedies such as administrative or arbitral tribunals available to plaintiffs and that thus the immunity they accord to international organizations does not infringe upon claimants' fundamental right of access to court. More "radical" are decisions which deny immunity because no alternative remedy is available in a specific case. 23. The "human rights impact assessment" is particularly evident in a number of European countries, obviously inspired by the ECtHR case law in the wake of Waite and Kennedy. 52 The availability of an alternative way of legal redress was important in the 29. More recently, this "radical" approach was also relied upon by French courts in employment matters. A prominent recent example of this development is the litigation by a former employee of the African Development Bank who could not access the organization's administrative tribunal because it was set up after his dismissal and thus lacked jurisdiction over his claim. In Banque africaine de développement v. M.A. Degboe, 68 the Cour de Cassation held that the impossibility of access to justice would constitute a denial of justice. Therefore, the defendant organization was not entitled to immunity from suit. 69 The
African Development Bank 70 is a regional international organization with its headquarters in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire, and consists mostly of African States. France is a so-called nonregional member country. The Cour de Cassation did not rely on Article 6(1) of the ECHR, most likely as a result of the predominantly non-European membership of the Bank. Instead, it relied on the concept of "ordre public international" encompassing the prohibition of a "déni de justice", or a "denial of justice". This approach demonstrates that the idea of a "forfeiture" of immunity in cases in which no alternative remedy is provided for is not limited to those situations where the right of access to justice is derived from the ECHR. Rather, it indicates that this concept may be "transferable" to other jurisdictions, where it may be based on due process or the prohibition of denial of justice understood as elements of an "ordre public international" or equally of customary international law. ILOAT. However, since this submission took place after the dispute arose, the tribunal lacked jurisdiction and the plaintiff had in fact no alternative means of dispute settlement. 31. Furthermore, the development of Belgian jurisprudence on this issue has been remarkable. While in 1982 one could find decisions dismissing all human rights arguments about the availability of an effective judicial remedy against acts of international organizations, 73 in 2003 an appellate court disregarded the treaty-based immunity of an international organization because of human rights concerns. In Siedler v. Western European Union, 74 it found that the internal procedure for the settlement of employment disputes within the WEU did not offer the guarantees necessary to secure a fair trial. Thus, the limitation on access to domestic courts as a result of the organization's immunity from suit was incompatible with Article 6(1) of the ECHR. This case is particularly remarkable: a national court upheld its own jurisdiction and denied the immunity of an international organization in employment matters not because no alternative remedy was available, but rather because it thought that the alternative remedy did not conform to the requirements of Article 6(1) of the ECHR as interpreted by the ECtHR in Beer and Regan 75 and Waite and Kennedy. 76 In these cases, the Strasbourg Court had not only made the immunity of the organization in question dependent upon the availability of an alternative dispute settlement mechanism, but had also stressed that it was crucial "whether the applicants had available to them reasonable alternative means to protect effectively their rights under the Convention." 77 The
Belgian court thus investigated whether the internal appeals procedure for employment disputes within the WEU offered all of the guarantees inherent in the notion of a fair trial and found several shortcomings: there were no provisions for the execution of the judgments of the WEU appeals commission; 78 there was no public hearing and the publication of an excessively close link with the organization itself; it was not possible to challenge a particular member of the commission. 80 Thus, the court concluded that the WEU personnel statute did "not offer all the guarantees inherent in the notion of due process" and that therefore "the limitation on the access to the normal courts by virtue of the jurisdictional immunity of the WEU [was] incompatible with Article 6(1) of the ECHR." 81 32. The availability of "reasonable" alternative means of redress as a requirement for the grant of jurisdictional immunity to international organizations was also discussed in the above-cited case of Energies nouvelles et environnement v. Agence spatiale européenne.
82 A Brussels court upheld ESA's immunity from suit because the claimant had one or more "reasonable" alternative means in the specific case. 83 In its judgment, the Belgian court explicitly relied upon the case law of the ECtHR and found that the possibility of diplomatic representations by the Belgian representative to ESA or even of bringing the claim before the organization's ombudsman, while not strictly speaking a form of judicial or administrative redress, would constitute "reasonable alternative means" in the sense of the ECtHR's jurisprudence.
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33. These Belgian cases clearly demonstrate that national courts are increasingly scrutinizing not only the availability of an alternative dispute settlement mechanism, but also the adequacy of such mechanisms. Although rarely coming to such "radical" conclusions as the Belgian tribunal above, national courts have in fact been considering the adequacy of alternative remedies for some time. The jurisprudence of German courts is instructive in this regard. For instance, in Hetzel v. EUROCONTROL, 85 the German Constitutional Court not only affirmed that German courts lacked jurisdiction over employment disputes between EUROCONTROL and its staff, but also held that the organization's immunity before German courts did not violate minimum requirements of the rule of law principle contained in the German Constitution because the exclusively competent ILOAT provided 80 Ibid., para. 61 ("Le mode de désignation et la courte durée du mandat comportent le risque que les membres de la commission soient trop étroitement liés à l'organisation. L'inamovibilité est un corollaire nécessaire de la notion d'indépendance. Une possibilité de récusation garantie de l'impartialité n'est pas prévue.").
81 Ibid., paras 62 et seq. ("Le recours organisé par le statut du personnel de l'UEO n'offre donc pas toutes les garanties inhérentes à la notion de procès équitable et certaines des conditions des plus essentielles font défaut. Il échet de constater dès lors que la limitation d'accès au juge ordinaire en raison de l'immunité juridictionnelle de l'UEO ne s'accompagne pas de voies de recours effectives au sens de l'art 6, §1 de la CEDH."). 37. Whether national courts correctly assess the adequacy of the level of alternative legal protection afforded to staff members by administrative tribunals or other alternative dispute settlement mechanisms may be questionable in individual cases. While they may generally be too deferential towards the quality of the alternative legal protection, 93 they may sometimes be overly zealous in questioning the adequacy of the alternatives. 94 The important point is that there is a clear development in the case law of domestic courts towards abandoning the traditional view of the immunity of international organizations, which merely decided on the basis of the applicable immunity provisions without considering the human rights impact of the decisions. The human rights-based notion of access to justice or similar customary international law or national constitutional law concepts of access to judicial determination of one's rights are playing an increasingly important role in the decision whether to grant an international organization immunity from suit.
III. The immunity of administrative tribunals and the possibility to challenge their decisions in national courts 38. Apart from the correlation between the jurisdictional immunity of an international organization and the availability of alternative dispute settlement mechanisms such as administrative tribunals, another immunity-related issue is likely to become increasingly relevant: the question of the immunity of administrative tribunals themselves, and whether and to what extent the decisions of these tribunals can be challenged by either national or international courts and tribunals. 39. It is obvious that "regular" judicial review of decisions of administrative tribunals is only available where the respective instruments make provision for such remedies. They can either allow appeals as in the traditional system within the EU 95 and as envisaged by the new UN system of administration of justice, 96 or they may permit extraordinary forms of review, such as the possibility of making a reference to the ICJ for an advisory opinion that was available to UNAT and ILOAT for a certain period of time.
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40. From an immunity perspective, it is more interesting to ask whether decisions of administrative tribunals may be challenged before national courts. Clearly, there is no direct avenue of legal control available to national courts to review the decisions of administrative tribunals. Similarly, administrative tribunals, usually set up as subsidiary organs of international organizations, "benefit" from the immunity of the international organization which established them. However, there are a number of possible indirect forms of control which may be considered.
41. One interesting early example of an attempted indirect review of a decision of a quasijudicial body is a case brought before English courts, in which the claimant sought to question a decision of the European Commission of Human Rights by suing one of its individual 99 Another case involved an attempt to challenge a decision of an international organization. In the Lenzing AG's European Patent case, 100 an English court was asked to review the legality of the revocation of the applicant's European patent by the relevant bodies of the European Patent Office. The court, however, dismissed the action, acknowledging that it lacked jurisdiction over such final decisions. 101 In a related case, the German Constitutional Court also decided that German courts lacked the power to review patent decisions of the European Patent Office because they did not constitute the exercise of German sovereign authority; 102 process" perspective should not be viewed as a threat to administrative tribunals. Rather, in the sense of an enlightened judicial dialogue which might contribute to the strengthening of fundamental rights, it should support administrative tribunals in their quest for reforming their own methods of the "administration of justice".
